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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
If so, it would seem that, although this case did not involve the ques-
tion of undue influence, the trial court was correct, as was held, in
telling the jury that they should contrast the two alleged wills as
bearing upon the issue of mental capacity.10
P. H. WINSTON.
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APPEAL AND ERROR-TRIAL PRACTICE-MOTION FOR DIRECTED
VEaRicT-Plaintiff brought an action of ejectment against defend-
ants. At the conclusion of all the evidence both parties moved for
directed verdicts. The case was submitted to the court for his
judgment on the law and evidence, and the court ruled in favor of
defendants. Held, on appeal, that since plaintiff failed to reserve
the right to go to the jury if his motion were denied, the ruling of
the court must stand as a final determination of the case.'
It is well settled that where both parties move for directed ver-
dicts it is a request that the court find the facts, and a judgment in
accordance with the court's ruling will not be disturbed unless the
ruling is wrong as a matter of law.2 The finding of the court on
the facts is equivalent to a verdict of the jury,3 and in the absence
of error of law the verdict will stand if supported by any evidence. 4
In the principal case there was conflicting evidence, and the court
found the facts in defendants' favor. Plaintiff did not make a re-
quest for specific instructions or reserve a right to go to the jury in
case his motion were denied, but relied wholly on his motion. Plain-
tiff having failed to take advantage of such right, the ruling against
him must stand as a final adjudication of the case.5 The law of the
sec. 194, bottom p. 222; Page, Wills (2 ed.) see. 706; Gardner, Wills (2 ed.)
ch. 5, sec. 49, p. 121; Schouler, Wills (6 ed.) Supplement (1926) sec. 219.'"In re Efird, 195 N. C. 76, 141 S. E. 460 (1928), a recent case discussing
both testamentary capacity and undue influence.
'Reynolds v. Zarlengo et al, 22 Fed. (2d) 626 (C. C. A. 8th. 1927).
'Meyer & Chapman State Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 291 Fed. 42 (1923);
Cuyamel Fruit Co. v. Johnson Iron Works, 262 Fed. 387 (1920); Dickinson
v. Harris, 242 Fed. 926 (1917) ; Sena v. Amer. Turquwis Co., 220 U. S. 497, 55
L. Ed. 559 (1911).
'Campbell v. Willis, 290 Fed. 271 (1923).
' U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Blake, 285 Fed. 449 (1923) ; Letta v.
Cincinnati Iron and Steel Co., 285 Fed. 707 (1922); Gosho Co. v. Southern
Pacific Co., 285 Fed. 227 (1922) ; Commander v. Provident Relief Ass'n., 126
Va. 455, 102 S. E. 89 (1920).
'Mayes v. U. S. Trust Co., 280 Fed. 25 (1922) ; City of Col., Tex. v. Harri-
son, 228 Fed. 894 (1916); Moore v. Fain, 251 Fed. 573, 163 C. C. A. 567
(1918) ; Interstate Life Assur. Co. v. Dalton, 165 Fed. 176 (1908) ; Sovereign
Camp W. 0. W. v. Beard, 26 Ga. App. 130, 105 S. E. 629 (1921).
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principal case seems to be undisputed. The case merely shows the
necessity and expediency of taking advantage of all permissible
rights at the trial, and of always being prepared for an adverse rul-
ing when a motion is made.
C. W. HALL.
Tolbert v. Buick Car, New York License, 6E2255, 140 S. E. 693
(S. C., 1927).
The plaintiff alleged in his affidavit "that he has an action against
the defendant for personal injuries inflicted by the said defendant
by reason of careless, reckless and negligent handling of
the defendant by its driver." The South Carolina Code gives the
person injured a lien on, and a right to attach, the automobile caus-
ing the injuries. The court held, that this statute allows an action
in rem against the automobile alone, and that no person need be
made a party defendant, though, if he wished, the owner or operator
might enter and defend. The purpose of the act was to secure a
sure remedy to persons injured, especially where the injury was by
persons or cars from a foreign state, in which cases questions of
jurisdiction and venue, as well as service of process, might under
the traditional procedure prevent an adequate remedy.
BANKS-TORT LIABILITY FOR THE WRONGFUL DISHONOR OF
CHECKS-MEASURE OF DAMAGES-Where the plaintiff had $50 in
the defendant bank at the time of the refusal to pay his check for
$6.00, he was allowed to recover in a suit in tort. There was an alle-
gation of malice, which was admitted by the demurrer. It was held,
that the mere failure to pay the check gave a right to nominal dam-
ages, and that the plaintiff shall be deemed substantially damaged,
for which substantial damages may be awarded. Where the non-
payment was malicious, punitive damages may also be given.'
It has long been settled that a refusal to honor a check, when there
are sufficient funds on deposit, is a breach of contract, 2 the theory
being that the assumption of the bank-depositor relation by the bank
involves an implied undertaking to honor checks for a sum equal to,
or less than, the deposit.
The tort liability has been imposed by three theories:
Woody v. First Nat. Bank, 194 N. C. 549, 140 S. E. 150 (1927).
'First Nat. Bank of Tamaqua v. Shoemaker, 117 Pa. 94, 11 AtI. 304 (1887).
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(1) The earliest of these is an English doctrine showing the
healthy influence of the law merchant. It considers the wrongful
dishonor of a check as a somewhat anomalous tort analogous to
slander of title (or disparagement of goods or credit) in that it
clearly injures reputation by injuring credit.3 Under this view if
the plaintiff is a trader or a merchant, he may recover substantial
damages without proof of actual damages ;4 if he is not a trader or
merchant, he may recover on the special damages proved to be the
"natural and probable consequences of the wrongful act." 5  This
theory regards proof by the plaintiff that he is a trader as equivalent
to proof of special damages, and allows a recovery of substantial
damages; without such proof mere nominal damages will be given.
(2) There are a large number of cases which are inconsistent
with this theory and, apparently, these are best accounted for by
following the second theory, one of American origin, to the effect
that banks are quasi-public corporations whose refusal to honor a
check, when sufficient funds are on deposit, is a violation of a public
duty imposed by the public policy of the law.6 Substantial damages
may be recovered by one not a trader or merchant without proof of
special damages,7 even when the mistake was innocently made.8
(3) A few cases have achieved the same results by assuming that
a refusal to honor a check is necessarily a discredit to the drawer
and an injury to him,9 since today banks are almost universally
used and relied upon.
The North Carolina case here considered takes this position, but
relies upon the quasi-public corporation theory to support it; it de-
clares that the distinction between trading and non-trading depositors
is obsolete.
'Marzetti v. Willians, 1 B. & D. 415, 109 Eng. Rep. 842 (1830) ; Doctrine
expanded in Rolin v. Steward, 14 C. B. 594, 139 Eng. Rep. 245 (1854).
'J. M. James Co. v. Continental Bank, 105 Tenn. 1, 58 S. W. 261 (1900);
Browning v. Bank of Vernal, 207 Pac. 462 (Utah-1922).
'Bank of Conmerce v. Goos, 39 Neb. 437 (1894); T. B. Clark Co. v. Mt.
Morris Bank, 181 N. Y. 533, 73 N. E. 1133 (1905) ; Third Nat. Bank of St.
Louis v. Ober., 178 Fed. 678, 102 C. C. A. 178 (1910, C. C. A.); State Bank of
Siloam Springs v. Marshall, 260 S. W. 431 (1924 Ark.).
'Patterson v. Marine Nat. Bank, 130 Pa. 419, 18 AtI. 632 (1889).
" Columbia Nat. Bank v. McKnight, 29 App. D. C. 580 (1907) ; Weiner v.
North Penn. Bank Inc., 65 Pa. Sup. Ct. 290 (1917) ; Metropolitan Supply Co. v.
Garden City Banking & Trust Co., 114 Ill. App. 318 (1904) ; Levin v. Corn.
Gerniania Trust & Savings Bank, 133 La. 492, 63 So. 601 (1913).
'Stevens v. Market St. Title & Trust Co., 65 Pa. Super. Ct. 288 (1917).
'Hilton v. Jesup Banking Co., 128 Ga. 30, 57 S. E. 78 (1907).
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Cases involving malice are rare, but where there is bad motive
or actual malice,1o or fraud, gross negligence, or oppression,1 1
exemplary or punitive damages, though doubtful on principle,12 are
generally allowed, as was the case here. Where there is malice, a
recovery for mental anguish is generally given,13 but not otherwise, 14
on the theory that mental anguish is not "a natural or reasonably
anticipated result of the dishonor of a check." 15
On authority this case is thoroughly sound, though it goes to
an extreme length in holding banks to a strict liability. It is clearly
demonstrative of the growing tendency to regard banks as occupying
a unique position in society, a status carrying with it new obligations.
The entire case is predicated upon the premise that the bank is no
mere creditor, but a corporation existing by governmental consent for
the discharge of a public, or quasi-public, duty.
D. S. GAmwINER.
In re Weeks, 20 Fed. (2d) 543 (W. D. Ky., 1927).
Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus out of Federal Court
to release him from confinement under a judgment of fine and im-
prisonment imposed by a Kentucky county judge, who, under a state
statute was entitled to ten per cent of the fine. The grounds upon
which the petitioner sought the writ was that the trial judge's
pecuniary interest denied him equal protection and due process of
law. Denied on the grounds that a writ of habeas corpus will not
issue out of Federal Court for denial of equal protection and due
process of law where the petitioner has failed to avail himself of his
right of appeal from the county judge's verdict to the state Circuit
Court, in which a trial de novo would have been had, with a further
"Am. Nat. Bank v. Morey, 113 Ky. 857, 69 S. W. 759 (1902).
"Winkler v. Citizens State Bank of Gueda Springs, 89 Kan. 279, 131 P.
597 (1911).
The doctrine of exemplary damages is an example of the usurpation of
criminal jurisdiction by civil courts. It is unsound in the following respects:
(1) Civil courts do not exist to punish or deter crime. (2) Compensatory
damages recompense fully for injuries, including mental anguish and loss of
reputation. (3) The doctrine ignores "reasonable doubt" and "presumption of
innocence," yet punishes the act as against society. (4) It allows the jury to
award final, arbitrary damages as a clear windfall for the plaintiff. '(5) It is
in essence a fine, yet it does not go to the state, nor does it mitigate a later
fine imposed by a criminal court.
Grenada Bank v. Lester, 98 So. 2 (Miss.-1921) ; Davis v. Standard Nat,
Bank, 5 App. Div. 210, 63 3q. Y. Supp. 764 (1900).
"Hartford v. All Night & Day Bank, 170 Cal. 538, 150 P. 356 (1915).
" Westeson v. Olathe State Bank, 240 P. 689 (Colo., 1925).
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right of appeal to the state Court of Appeals. The court distin-
guishes the instant case from Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U. S.
510, 47 S. Ct. 437 (1927, discussed in 5 N. C. L. Rev. 357) upon
the fact that the Thntey Case did not reach the Supreme Court
through habeas corpus proceedings, but by writ of error out of that
court to the Ohio Supreme Court.
BnLLS AND NOTES-BANKS AND BANKING-CECKS--RIGHTS OF
HOLDER AGAINST DRwwEE-The plaintiff is a national bank, the
defendant a state bank. The plaintiff upon receiving checks, in the
regular course of its business, drawn on the defendant bank pre-
sented them over the counter of the defendant bank for payment.
The defendant refused to pay said checks and drafts unless per-
mitted to deduct an exchange charge of one-eighth of one per cent.
as authorized by Consolidated Statutes 220(z) making such a charge
on remittances legal. Defendafit's conduct forces the plaintiff to
return such checks and drafts dishonored or make remittances free,
because its correspondents will not stand for a double charge on this
service. Upon these facts the trial court held that the defendant
drawee was not the remitting bank within the meaning of the statute
and issued an injunction restraining the defendant from charging
exchange on checks paid over the counter. On appeal to the Supreme
Court the judgment was affirmed. The court stated that the defend-
ant owed the plaintiff a duty which it had failed to perform, namely
that of paying at par checks paid over the counter, and drawn on
accounts in which there were sufficient funds for payment; that the
defendant bank was not the remitting bank and therefore was not
entitled to the exchange charge authorized by statute.'
It is a familiar principle that the plaintiff must show a clear legal
or equitable right, free from reasonable doubt, in order to obtain
equity's extraordinary relief of injunction.2 It is clear that the
statute which the defendant cites as authority for its charge on checks
paid over the counter does not authorize the charge that it is making,
'First National Bank of Roxboro v. People's Bank, 194 N. C. 720, 140 S.
E. 705 (Dec. 1927).
2 Snowden v. Noa, Hopk. 347; Scott v. Burton, 2 Ashm. 312; C. S. sec. 843;
Frink v. Stewart, 94 N. C. 848 (1886); Newton v. Brown, 134 N. C. 445
(1904); Porter v. Armstrong, 132 N. C. 66 (1903); Phifer v. Barnhart, 88
N. C. 333 (1883) ; Jones v. Comrs., 107 N. C. 248, 12 S. E. 69 (1890) ; Moore
v. Mining Co., 104 N. C. 534, 10 S. E. 679 (1889).
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for payment over the counter is not a remittance.8 But the ques-
tion of whether the holder of a check which the drawee refuses to
pay has any rights to have payment at all or upon condition remains
unsettled. The cases indicate that no such right has heretofore been
recognized. No case has been found in which equity granted relief
to the holder of a check against the drawee who refused to pay it,
absolutely or upon condition, or in which the holder has been given
a legal right to damages for refusal to pay his check.
A check is not an assignment of the whole or any part of the
account upon which it is drawn. 4 The drawee is the debtor of the
drawer and is liable to the drawer in damages for a failure to honor
the drawer's check.5 But according to the apparent weight of au-
thority at common law, and under the N. I. L., the payee or holder
of a check or draft has no rights against the drawee until and unless
the drawee has accepted it.6
There is one line of cases which has adopted the view under the
common law that there is a contract between drawer and drawee for
the benefit of the payee or holder, and that the holder therefore has
the rights of a third party beneficiary under this contract.7 But this
' First National Bank of Roxboro v. People's Bank, note 1, supra at J!. 722,
and citations there given.
"Hawes v. Blackwell, 107 N. C. 196, 12 S. E. 245 (1890); Commercial Na-
tional Bank v. First National Bank of Gastonia, 118 N. C. 783, 24 S. E. 524
(1896) ; Perry v. Bank of Smithfield, 131 N. C. 117, 43 S. E. 837 (1902) ; Trust
Co. v. Bank, 166 N. C. 112, 83 S. E. 474 (1914). Tort Liability for Wrongful
Dishonor of Checks, ante p. 322.
' 3 C. S. 220 (in), "No bank shall be liable to a depositor because of non-
payment through mistake or error, and without malice, of a check which should
have been paid ... except for actual damage by reason of such non payment,
that the depositor shall prove . . . " Note that this line of cases discusses the
drawer's rights against the bank. Failure to pay the holder of checks because
of his refusal to pay exchange will cause the checks to be returned dishonored
to the drawer who then may have a right of action against the bank for
damages. The injunction granted in this case prevents dishonor of checks
for failure to pay exchange when checks are paid over the counter and is
undoubtedly sound on the basis of public policy if for no other reason.
ON. 1. L. sec. 189 "A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of
any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank and the bank
is not liable to the holder unless and until it accepts or certifies the check."
For N. C. cases see note 4 supra. Robertson Banking Co. v. Brasfield, 202
Ala. 167, 79 So. 651 (1918) ; State Bank of Chicago v. Mid-City Trust & Say.
Bk., 295 Ill. 599, 129 N. E. 498 (1921) ; Stevenson v. Earling, 213 Ill. App. 395,
affd. 290 Ill. 565, 125 N. E. 322 (1920); First National Bank of Murfreesboro
v. First National Bank of Nashville, 127 Tenn. 205, 154 S. W. 965 (1913);
Rights of Holder of Bill of Exchange Against the Drawee, 38 Harv. L. Rev.
857.
,Munn v. Burch, 25 Ill. 35 (1860).
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view has been denied by the Supreme Court of the United States8
and no authority for it can be found in this state.
Another line of cases has gone on the theory of a trust relation-
ship between bank and depositor upon which the holder of a check or
draft can sue as assignee.9 But it is well settled that a bank is the
debtor of the depositor and not the trustee for his benefit.
This decision seems a novel one in recognizing that the holder
does have a right against the drawee to payment without deduction
for exchange, and the result seems desirable from a business and
economic viewpoint.' 0 The defendant's conduct as a bank against
another bank, causing the plaintiff to lose charges to which it was
entitled as the remitting bank savors of unfair practice." Also the
plaintiff bank is the holder of not one or two checks but of large
batches of them. Public policy under the theory that it is economic-
ally unsound to have a large backwash of dishonored checks flowing
through banking channels, is against the practice of charging ex-
change on payments over the counter, but no previous authority has
been found giving the holder of checks and drafts a right to payment
over the counter at par.
G. M. SHAW.
Everhart v. Atlantic Fire Insurance Co., 194 N. C. 494, 140 S. E. 78
(1927).
Everhart held a mortgage on a house for $1600. The defendant
insurance company issued a policy for $600 ofi the house to Ayers,
the mortgagor, with a loss payable clause attached. The house was
destroyed by fire and Ayers, the mortgagor, gave a release of the
claim to the company for $450. Held, the agreement and release
are binding upon the mortgagee in the absence of collusion or fraud.
CRIMINAL LAW-SUSPENDED SENTENcE-At the September
term, 1925, the defendant pleaded guilty to the possession of whiskey.
8Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 152 (1869).
" Woody v. National Bank of Rocky Mount, 194 N. C. 549, at page 551, 140
S. E. 150.
"0Prof. C. T. Murchison, "Par Clearance of Checks," 2 N. C. L. Rev. 36
(1923-24).
'1 Cf. So. Royalton Bank v. Suffolk Bank, 27 Vt. 505 (1855) ; American
Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Bank of Atlanta, 256 U. S. 350, 41 Sup. Ct. 499,
65 L. ed. 983 (1921), examples of equitable relief againtt holder of checks for
unfair practices against drawee bank, almost the converse of present situation.
See also Farmer's & Merchant's Bank of Catlettsburg, Ky., v. Fed. Res. Bank
of Cleveland, 286 Fed. 566 (1923).
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He was fined $150 and costs, but prayer for judgment was continued
for twelve months, defendant being required to give bond in the sum
of $150 for his appearance at the next term of court to show good
behavior. The fine and costs were paid at the 1925 term. At the
spring term, 1926, the judgment was continued under the former
order, and at the fall term, 1926, the case was removed from the
docket. At the March term, 1927, the presiding judge found that
defendant had violated the condition of the suspended sentence, with-
out stating the facts as to the violation, and sentenced defendant to
twelve months imprisonment. Defendant appealed, and the Supreme
Court held there was error, and that defendant was entitled to be
discharged. State v. Gooding, 194 N. C. 271, 139 S. E. 436 (1927).
North Carolina holds that the power to suspend sentence during
compliance with various conditions is inherent in criminal courts of
general jurisdiction.' The defendant cannot be punished for the
same offense twice, however, and in the principal case it seems that
under the judgment of the trial court this was done. Payment of
the costs is not a part of the punishment,2 but when in addition to
this a fine is imposed, it seems that the power of the court is ex-
hausted and the subsequent sentence of imprisonment void.3
An essential condition to the suspension of the sentence is the
consent of the prisoner, express or implied, and he may, if he wishes,
take his punishment instead,4 thus saving his right of appeal, and
the opportunity to clear himself of the charge. He consents, or his
consent is implied from his silence,5 on the ground that it is bene-
ficial to him, and on compliance with the terms he will escape execu-
tion. On complying with the terms for the stated time, the case is
removed from the docket; and this, in substance, if not technically,
amounts to a discontinuance of the cause, and the court is thereafter
without further power to molest the defendant on this chargeo
The judge at his discretion has the power to decide when the
condition on which the sentence was suspended has been violated.7
'State v. Crook, 115 N. C. 760, 20 S. E. 513 (1894) ; State v. Hardin, 183 N.
C. 815, 112 S. E. 593 (1922) ; 1 N. C. L. R. 116 (1922).
'State v. Crook, supra, note 1.
'State v. Warren, 92 N. C. 825 (1885).
'State v. Burgess, 192 N. C. 668, 135 S. E. 771 (1926) ; State v. Griffin, 117
N. C. 710, 23 S. E. 164 (1895).
'State v. Everitt, 164 N. C. 399, 79 S. E. 274 (1913).
'State v. Hilton, 151 N. C. 687, 65 S. E. 1011 (1909).
'State v. Everitt, supra, note 5.
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He must find this in open court,8 and he cannot delegate his dis-
cretion to the sheriff, clerk or non-judicial officer.9 However, it is
not necessary for a jury to find the facts as to the violation,1o and
the judge's discretion is not reviewable except when grossly
abused ;11 but the judge must find as a fact, and not as a mere in-
ference, that the conditions have been violated, and his finding of
facts must be a part of the record.12 The condition in the principal
case is good behavior; this, as defined by our court, means conduct
authorized by law, and a violation of this is behavior such as the
law, as enforced by the court in question, will punish.13 This is the
definition given by the Federal Courts, 4 and by Bouvier's Diction-
ary. This is a test that is easy to apply, and also puts a limit on
the judge's discretion, thus making for more certainty. Within this
limit, however, it seems that the judge should have discretion as to
the seriousness of the violation, that is that a petty offense, such as
the violation of the speed law on the open highway, should not auto-
matically invoke enforcement of the sentence for a crime entirely
disproportionate, such as assault with intent to kill. In any case, the
judge's finding must show a violation of the law, or if a specific
condition is imposed, the violation of that. 15
The power to suspend sentence is very beneficial when properly
used for the reformation of the offender and the humane adminis-
tration of justice, but to be effective it must really do what in theory
it is intended to do, that is reform the culprit. To accomplish this
there should be close supervision of the conduct of the one so freed
by a special officer of the court appointed for that purpose, he should
be made to realize the strength of the law which is suspended above
him, and to faithfully carry out the conditions imposed. This should
be the aim in the development of this subject, rather than the unwar-
ranted extension of the practice attempted by the trial judge in the
principal case, but correctly denied by the Supreme Court.
D. K. MOOR E.
'State v. Burnett, 173 N. C. 734, 91 S. E. 364 (1916).
State v. Phillips, 185 N. C. 614, 115 S. E. 893 (1923)." State v. Everitt, supra, note 5.
" State v. Green. 173 N. C. 759, 92 S. E. 147 (1917).
12 State v. Hardin, supra, note 1.
" State v. Hardin, supra, note 1.
"In Re Spencer, 22 Federal Cases 921 (1878).
"State v. Shepherd, 187 N. C. 609, 122 S. E. 467 (1923).
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State v. Will Taylor, 194 N. C. 738, 140 S. E. 745 (1927).
The defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree and
sentenced to death. He gave notice of appeal, but failed to prose-
cute the same, although he was allowed to appeal in forna pauperis.
Held, that an appeal from a judgment in a criminal case, rendered
prior-to the commencement of a term of the Supreme Court, must
be brought at the next succeeding term, otherwise it will be dismissed.
There is one modification to this requirement: the appellant may
docket the record proper and move for a certiorari, which motion
the court may allow at its discretion. No such motion being made
in this case, and no error appearing on the record, the appeal was
docketed and dismissed. It seems to be pretty hard to deny an
appeal on such technical grounds when it is realized that the defend-
ant was an ignorant negro from outside the state and a pauper, who
testified that he was drunk on the night in question and had no
recollection of what happened.
DAMAGES-APPORTIONMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES BETWEEN
CORPORATION AND EMPLOYEE FOR WRONGFUL ACT OF EMPLOYEE-
In an action against the Atlantic Coast Line Railway Company and
J. A. Dorsey, railroad detective, the plaintiff alleged that Dorsey
forced him to submit to a search of his person and effects
that Dorsey had no warrant . . . that Dorsey detained plaintiff
from his business as a "News-Butcher" and in his custody
that the torts complained of were willful and malicious . . . that
no whiskey was found. The defendant railroad was joined in the
action on the theory of respondeat superior. The jury answered all
issues in favor of the plaintiff, and his honor signed the following
judgment:
"$200 actual damages against both defendants jointly, and $1800
punitive damages, apportioned between the two defendants, with
$1500 against the railroad, and $300 against the defendant Dorsey."
Held, judgment affirmed."
Mr. Justice Blease2 for the court announced the rule to be that
the master is not liable in compensatory damages for a greater
amount than that assessed against the agent; but that in assessing
punitive damages the things to be considered are, "punishment of
'Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 140 S. E. 443 (S. C. 1927).
'With whom concurred Watts, C. J. and Stabler, J.
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those responsible for the injury," "nature of the wrong committed,"
and the "ability of the wrongdoer to pay," deciding therefore that
the principal should sometimes be required to pay a larger sum as
punitive damages than the agent, notwithstanding the only wrong
charged against the principal is the wrong of the agent.
Mr. Justice Cothran3 dissenting argues strenuously for a dis-
tinction between the case at bar: a joint action against a master and
his servant based upon a tort which was the result of a willful act of
the servant alone, in which kind of action he contends punitive dam-
ages ought not be apportioned, and a case of joint action against a
master and servant based upon a tort which was the result of the
combined willfulness of both, asserting that in such a case a verdict
for punitive damages might be apportioned, contending the test
should be whether the facts show a joint wrongdoing or whether the
master's liability attaches only by virtue of the respondeat superior
theory.
The question whether a defendant corporation shall be held in
punitive damages for the unauthorized and unratified malicious or
wanton acts of its lesser servants presents an irreconcilable conflict.4
Some courts hold that a corporation is liable in punitive damages for
the wrongs of its agents and servants, acting within the scope of
their employment, provided the essentials of a case for punitive dam-
ages against the servant are present. 5 Others refuse to allow punitive
damages against a corporation for the acts of its lesser servants
unless there was active participation in the wrongdoing by the cor-
poration," an authorization or ratification by its executive agents, 7 or,
perchance, unless the corporation failed to use due care in the selec-
tion of the employee.8
' Purdy, A. A., J. concurs in the dissent.
'Note 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 35.
'Stewart v. Cary Lumber Co., 146 N. C. 47, 59 S. E. 545 (1907) ; Reeves v.
R. Co., 68 S. C. 89, 46 S. E. 543 (1904) ; Anderson v. International Harvester
Co., 116 N. W. 101, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 440 (1908); Peterson v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 75 Minne. 368, 77 N. W. 985 (1899) ; Forrester v.So. Pac. R.
Co., 36 Nev. 247, 134 p. 753 (1913).
'Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 37 L. ed. 97 (1893);
Chi., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Newborn, 27 Okl. 9, 110 Pac. 1065 (1910) ; Voves
v. G. N. Ry. Co., 26 N. D. 110, 143 N. W. 760 (1913) ; Dunshee v. Std. Oil.
Co., 165 Iowa 625, 146 N. W. 830 (1914) ; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 150 Ala.
574, 43 S. E. 210 (1907) ; Emnwke v. De Silva (C. C. A. 8th 1923), 293 Fed. 17.
"Denver, etc., Ry. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597, 30 L. Ed. 1146 (1887) ; Bing-
hrn v. Lipinan, 40 Oregon 363, 67 Pac. 98 (1901).
'Cleghorn v. N. Y., etc. Ry. Co., 56 N. Y. 44, 15 Am. Rep. 375 (1874) ; 1
Sedgwick, Damages, 9th. ed., Sec. 378.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Exemplary or punitive damages were designed as a punishment
for the wrongdoer.9 As the object of the rule, therefore, is to find a
convenient method of punishing the offender, it follows that the rule
should be invoked only in cases where the one to be charged is him-
self guilty of oppressive conduct-maliciousness, willfulness, wan-
tonness, or gross negligence. 10 When can it be said that a corporation
has acted maliciously or wantonly so as to render itself liable for a
punishment by the imposition of punitive damages?
The rule holding a corporation responsible for all physical in-
juries, humiliation, mental suffering, etc., based upon the sole wrong-
doing of its servant on the theory of respondeat superior, is well
established and logically sound."1 However, to hold the corporation
for the mental attitude, for the passions, for every act of its lesser
servants, assuming there was no authorization, ratification, or con-
donation of the wrong, and no negligence in the selection of the
servant, on the announced theory of punishment for the offender is a
harsh rule. Wherein has the corporation offended, so as to render
it liable to be punished, if it has exercised care and prudence in the
selection and instruction of its servants? What additional measures
of care can the corporation resort to in future employment to avoid
a constant liability for punishment for the offenses of its lesser
employees?
No sound reason appears why the rule of imputed liability, by
which the corporation is held responsible for compensation for in-
juries resulting from the act of its servant, should be extended to
include liability for "smart money," whose standing in the law,
never secure,12 is based not on the theory of compensation for injury
done but upon the theory of a punishment. The practical result of
' Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lunsden, 172 U. S. 534, 43 L. ed. 543 (1899) ;
Bowles v. Lowery, 5 Ala. App. 555, 59 So. 696 (1912) ; Stricklen v. Pearson
Const. Co., 184 Iowa 1255, 169 N. W. 628 (1918) ; See Damages, Dec. Dig. Key
no. 87; 1 Sedgwick, Damages, Sec. 354 et seq.
" Birmingham & Electric Ry. Co. v. Baird, 130 Ala. 334, 30 So. 456 (1901);
Foley v. Martin, 142 Cal. 256, 71 Pac. 165 (1903) ; Otto Kurhue Preserving
Co. v. Allen, 148 F. 666 (1906) ; Ky. Heating Co. v. Hood. 133 Ky. 383, 118 S.
W. 337 (1909) ; Brown v. Asheville Electric Light Co., 138 N. C. 533, 51 S. E.
62 (1905) ; B. & 0. R. Co. v. Boyd, 67 Md. 32, 10 Atl. 315 (1887).
" Pa. Iron Wks. v. Henry Voght Mach. Co., 139 Ky. 497, 96 S. W. 351
(1906); Aultman & Taylor Machine Co. v. Gay, 108 Va. 647, 62 S. E, 946
(1908) ; Baker v. Chi., etc., Ry. Co., 243 Ill. 482, 90 N. E. 1057 (1910).
1 Sedgwick, Damages, Sec. 353; Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 343, 16 Am. Rep.
270 (1873) ; Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481, 14 A. 488 (1888) said: " . . . a
sort of hybrid between a display of ethical indignation and the imposition of a
criminal fine."
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such a rule as announced by the majority in instant case is to
inflict a fine upon the corporation for not being "omnipotent" and
camouflage it under the guise of damages.
C. R. JONAS.
Coble v. Dick, 194 N. C. 732, 140 S. E. 745 (1927).
The defendant conveyed a certain city lot to the plaintiff, the
deed containing "full covenants and warranties against all incum-
brances whatsoever." Prior to the conveyance, street and sidewalk
assessments had been legally levied against the property, payable in
annual installments for a ten-year period. The plaintiff was re-
quired to pay three installments and brought suit to recover that
amount, the cause of action being based upon the warranties against
incumbrances contained in the deed. Held, judgment for plaintiff.
A street assessment lien is to be regarded in the nature of a statutory
mortgage and was an incumbrance within the meaning of the war-
ranty clause in the deed from defendant to plaintiff.
EvIDENCE-PRoR CONVICTION AS EVIDENCE IN A SUBSEQUENT
CIVIL SuiT-Plaintiff was convicted under a Virginia statute of
willfully burning his stock of goods with intent to defraud the insur-
ance company. In a suit upon the insurance policy the lower court
refused evidence of previous conviction and gave judgment for
plaintiff. Held, reversed. Conviction was determinative of that
particular fact against plaintiff and when admitted in evidence there
could be but one proper verdict and that for defendant. Eagle, Star
& British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 140 S. E. 314 (Va. 1927).
The clear weight of authority supports the rule that a judgment
of conviction or acquittal rendered in a criminal prosecution cannot
be given in evidence in a purely civil action to establish the truth of
the facts on which it was rendered.1
The reasons advanced- for the rule are the difference in parties,
lack of mutuality since the adversary of the person convicted would
not have been estopped to dispute the facts if the prosecution had
terminated in an acquittal, the difference in rules of evidence and
'4 Jones, Evidence (1926) nos. 1816, 1817; 15 R. C. L. 1000; 31 A. L. R.
262 (note) ; 11 L. R. A. 653 (note); Seaboard Air Line Ry v. O'Quin, 124 Ga.
357, 52 S. E. 427 (1.905) ; State v. Knapp, 177 Iowa 278, 158 N. W. 515 (1916)
Myers v. Md. Casualty Co., 123 Mo. App. 182, 101 S. W. 124 (1907).
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procedure which prevail in civil and criminal cases, and the differing
degrees of proof required.
2
While the judgment is inadmissible to prove the truth of the facts
upon which it is rendered it may always be admitted to establish
the fact of its rendition.3 Where the judgment in the criminal court
is the foundation of the civil suit or when the subsequent action,
although civil in form, is quasi criminal as in actions for penalties, 4
the record showing a plea of guilty in the prior criminal suit is
admissible not as a judgment but as an admission.6
The instant case is against the weight of authority but is sup-
ported by reason and a number of well considered cases. The rule
of exclusion is to protect those who have had no opportunity to
assert their defense and there seems to be no reason why the accused
should not be bound by a decision adverse to him.6 He has had his
day in court and the benefit of the most strenuous degree of proof
required.7 It is logical that the record of an acquittal should not
bind the other party since the prosecution may have failed merely
to prove the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.8
The court says that failure to admit the judgment was in effect
a collateral attack upon the former judgment. It admits that a judg-
ment in the criminal case is not res judicata but thinks that it is
closely related and on the grounds of public policy should be ex-
tended so as to embrace within the estoppel of a judgment, persons
who are not, strictly speaking, either parties or privies. 9
It is submitted that reason if not authority favors the result in
this case and that evidence of such probative value should be ad-
mitted in civil suits as persuasive evidence at least.
S. SHAnuP.
'Freeman, Judgments (1925), no. 654; 31 A. L. R. 264 (note).
' See Sims v. Sims, 75 N. Y. 472 (1878) ; 4 Jones, Evidence (1926) no. 1818.
'U. S. v. Rosenthal, 174 Fed. 652 (1909); Coffey v. U. S., 116 U. S. 436
(1886).
5Albrecht v. State, 62 Miss. 516 (1885) ; Steward v. Steward, 93 N. J. Eq.
1, 114 Atl. 851 (1921); 5 Ann Cases 78.
' Tucker v. Tucker, 137 At. 404 (N. J. 1927) ; But see 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 97.
In re Crippen, L. R. (1911) Prob. 108; Randall v. Randall, 4 Me. 326 (1826);
11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 653 (note); 41 Harv. L. Rev. 241.
'A judgment in a civil suit is not admissible in a subsequent criminal prose-
cution since it would not be just to convict a defendant by reason of a judgment
obtained against him civilly by a mere preponderance of the evidence. 15 R.
C. L. 1004.
'Sibley v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 22 Fed. Cases 60; Cottingham
v. Weeks, 54 Ga. 275 (1875).
'See Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 140 S. E. 318, 319
(1927).
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The Federal No. 2, 21 F. (2d) 313 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
A seaman was injured while employed on board a barge owned
by the appellants, a Canadian company. The injury occurred through
the negligence of the appellee, owners of the towing tug, Federal
No. 2. The seaman was removed to the United States Marine Hos-
pital, where expenses were incurred for his maintenance and cure.
Under the maritime law of the flag of the vessel, the appellant, as
employer, was compelled to pay these expenses. He filed this libel
for reimbursement. Recovery was denied on the ground that the
negligence of the libelee was too remote. In fact, the negligence of
the libelee did cause loss to the libellant, as fully as the negligence
of any defendant causes loss to an injured plaintiff by compelling
him to incur expense for hospital and medical attention. By holding
the result to be remote, has not the court merely made use of an
overworked expression to hold, in substance, that reimbursement of
the libellant is not included in the scope of protection afforded by
the rules of negligence?
INSURANCE-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-LIABILITY OF AGENT TO
INSURED-In a recent case,' a general agent and fire insurance broker
was held liable, after the plaintiff had failed in a suit in the Federal
Court against the insurance company on the policy,2 for his negligent
failure to insert a clause in the policy waiving the condition therein
that it should be void unless insured was the owner in fee of the
ground on which the building stood. The prior suit against the
insurance company, whose identity was not actually known to the
plaintiff till after the fire, was held not to constitute an election be-
tween the liability of agent and undisclosed principal.
The result is satisfactory but the exact relationship of the parties
was not clearly defined. The case is interesting because upon the
admitted facts the policy would have been valid if sued upon in the
state courts. "Conditions which form a part of the contract of in-
surance at its inception may be waived by the agent of the insurer,
although they are embraced in the policy when it is delivered, and
the local agent's knowledge of such conditions is deemed to be the
knowledge of his principal."'3 And this is so, generally, even though
Case v. Eubanks, 194 N. C. 775, 140 S. E. 709 (1927).
'Northern Assur. Co. Ltd. v. Case, 12 F. (2d.) 551 (1926).
'Bullard v. Insurance Co., 189 N. C. 34, 126 S. E. 179 (1925); Ins. Co. v.
Lumber Co., 186 N. C. 269, 119 S. E. 362 (1923) ; Smith v. Ins. Co., 193 N. C.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the policy when delivered and accepted contains a denial of the
agent's authority to waive any conditions, 4 or permits a waiver only
by writing attached to the policy.5 But the federal courts apply their
own rules in interpreting such contracts, 6 and in that court mere
knowledge of the agent issuing the policy will not constitute a waiver
of the conditions existing at the inception of the contract. The policy
contains the only way by which its terms can be waived.
7
The effect of the rule in the present case is to make the broker
liable for failure to procure a policy valid in its entirety in both state
and federal courts.8
But aside from contract liability on the policy it would seem that
the insurance company might be held answerable on general prin-
ciples of agency for damages suffered by reason of its negligent fail-
ure, through its agent (treating defendant as agent of the insurer
alone) to issue a valid policy.9 It is generally held, however, that a
fire insurance broker is agent of the insured,10 although as to the
procuring of the insurance he may also represent the company. 1
As agent of the insured he is liable on ordinary principles of agency
446, 137 S. E. 310 (1927) ; Aldridge v. Ins. Co., 194 N. C. 683, 140 S. E. 706
(1927).
'Vance, Insurance, see. 124, p. 367. Gualtney v. Provident Savings Life
Assur. Soc., 132 N. C. 925, 44 S. E. 659 (1903) ; idem, 134 N. C. 552, 47 S. E.
122 (1904) ; Hardy v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 154 N. C. 430, 70 S. E. 828 (1911);
Godfrey v. Ins. Co., 169 N. C. 239 (1915).
Richards, Insurance, sec. 160, p. 195; 23 Mich. L. R. 305; Security Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Riley, 157 Ala. 553, 47 So. 735 (1908) ; Allen v. Phoenix Ins.
Co., 14 Idaho 728, 95 Pac. 829 (1908) ; Weed v. London and Lancashire Ins.,
116 N. Y. 117, 22 N. E. 229 (1889) ; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Hart, 149 Il1. 513, 36
N. E. 990 (1894); Knarston v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 124 Cal. 74, 76, 56
Pac. 773 (1899).
'Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 865; Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215
U. S. 349, 30 Sup. Ct. 140 (1901).
" Northern Assur. Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Assn., 183 U. S. 308, 22 Sup. Ct.
133 (1902) ; New York Lumber Underwriters v. Rife, 237 U. S. 605, 35 Sup.
Ct. 117 (1915).
S In the suit against the insurance company, plaintiff recovered judgment on
the policy with respect to the furniture, under the federal rule that treats as
divisible a contract of insurance upon a house and furniture, apportioned as to
each, though carried under one premium.
Northern Assur. Co. Ltd. v. Case, supra, note 2, at p. 552; Douney v. Ger-
man Alliance Ins. Co., 152 Fed. 701 (1918). The rule is contra in N. C.,
Co gis v. Aetna Ins. Co., 144 N. C. 8, 56 S. E. 506 (1907).
qTiffany, Agency, sec. 38; 2 Mechem, Agency, sec. 1855.
" Sellers v. Ins. Co., 105 Ala. 282, 16 So. 798 '(1895) ; Ins. Co. v. Knabe and
Co., 171 Mass. 265, 50 N. E. 516 (1898) ; Fire Assur. of Phila. v. Hogwood, 82
Va. 342, 48 S. E. 617 (1887) ; Crown Point Iron Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 127 N.
Y. 601, 28 N. E. 653 (1891).
"International Paper Co. v. Gen'l. Fire Assur. Co., 263 Fed. 363 (1920);
East St. Louis v. Brenner, 59 Ill. App. 604 (1895) ; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
Reynolds, 36 Mich. 502 (1877).
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for negligence in the performance of his duty to his principal.
"Where an insurance agent or broker undertakes to procure a policy
of insurance for another to insure against a designated risk, the law
imposes upon him the duty in the exercise of reasonable care, to
perform the duty he has assumed, and he may be held liable for the
loss attributable to his negligent default within the amount of the
proposed policy he has failed to secure." 12 Under this view of the
case no question of election of liability as between agent and undis-
closed principal can arise.' 3 The fact that the measure of liability
of the agent for his failure to procure valid insurance is the amount
that would have been due under the policy (deducting the amount
that would have been paid out as premiums)34 possibly led defendant
to suppose that he was being sued on the same cause of action as the
insurance company had been.
The case illustrates the precarious status of an insurance agent
and broker. He is treated under these facts as at once agent of the
insurer, for he can waive conditions inserted in the policy for in-
surer's benefit, and as agent of the insured, in that he is liable for
breach of his contract to procure valid insurance.
H. G. GoDwIxN.
Anderson v. City of Asheville, 194 N. C. 117, 138 S. E. 715 (1927).
Civil action to enjoin defendant from making any expenditures
under a legislative act by which defendant city was to be divided into
zones or districts for the purpose of fixing an ad valorem basis of
taxation on real estate, taxation to be uniform within each zone but
the zones to be classified according to density of population and
character of the building. Held, that the act was unconstitutional
in that it violated those clauses of the North Carolina Constitution
which require taxes to be uniform and ad valorem.
MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY FOR tNJURIES TO THIRD PER-
SONS-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT---"IS the owner of a milk wagon
liable for the negligence of the driver thereof causing injury to a
Elam v. Realty Co., 182 N. C. 559, 109 S. E. 566 (1921).
Even though the broker did not tell plaintiff the name of the insuring
company, his knowledge of that fact, as agent of insured is imputed to him,
and therefore could not be said to be undisclosed to him. Notice to agent is
notice to principal. 2 Mechem, Agency, sec. 1803.
" 32 C. J. Insurance, 172; 18 A. L. R. 1219.
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nine-year-old boy, employed by the driver to assist him, or permitted
to ride on the wagon or get in and out of it, all in violation of the
express rules duly prescribed by the master ?" This is the issue pre-
sented in Hayes v. Pine State Creamery.1  The court answers it in
the negative, holding the acts of the driver were outside the scope of
his employment.
Vicarious liability is predicated on a situation where the servant
is acting within the scope of his employment. On this rule the
courts are in perfect harmony. The discord arises only in the appli-
cation of the rule to the facts of a particular case, and results from
the various conceptions and misconceptions as to the meaning of the
phrase "scope of employment." An excellent example of this is found
in a leading Ohio case, Higbee Co. v. Jackson,2 wherein a boy was
invited onto the running board of defendant's truck and was injured
in a collision caused by the servant's careless driving. Recovery
against defendant was allowed on the ground that the plaintiff, a
trespasser, was injured by the "wanton and reckless acts of the driver
while in the course and scope of his employment,"3 and aware of the
plaintiff's perilous position. Jones, J., entered a vigorous dissent on
the ground that the unauthorized permission was outside the scope
of the driver's employment 4 and could impose no liability on de-
fendant, regardless of the degree of negligence exhibited by the
driver. 5 This view was maintained by our court in Dover v. Mfg.
Co.,6 and, while in a later case the court expressed an opinion that
if the servant knew of the perilous position of the boy riding on the
rear step of an ice wagon, and recklessly exposed him to danger by
driving in front of an approaching street car, a jury might properly
find the master liable, that case is reconcilable on its facts.7
1195 N. C. 113, 116, 141 S. E. 340, 342 (1928). Quotation from opinion of
Brogden, J.
2101 Ohio St. 75, 128 N. E. 61, 14 A. L. R. 131 (1920), cited in principal
case, ibid., 117; ibid., 342.
:"Scope of employment" used to denote driving of truck.
'"Scope of employment" used to denote authority of driver to invite third
persons to ride.
'The argument being that the plaintiff's wrongful presence was the cause
of the injury. While it is true that the injury would not have occurred but for
his being on the truck, nevertheless, the proximate cause was the negligent
driving of the servant, within the scope of his employment, and the argument
is another application of the fallacious "but for" theory. For discussion of this
theory, see Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (1911), 25 Harv.
L. Rev. 103, 108.
'157 N. C. 324, 72 S. E. 1067, 46 L. R. A. (N. s.) 199 (1911).
"Fry v. Utilities Co., 183 N. C. 281, 111 S. E. 354 (1922). There was evi-
dence that defendant's officers knew of the custom of small children to ride on
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In the instant case the plaintiff had assisted the driver for about
a month, receiving sometimes milk and sometimes a nickel as re-
muneration. His injuries were sustained from a fall when he
attempted to get into the moving wagon with some empty bottles.
He was in full view of the driver, who had never warned him against
getting into the wagon when it was moving, but frequently did so
himself. It is well settled that one invited or permitted to ride on
a vehicle by a servant in violation of express orders is an invitee as
to the servant, but a trespasser as to the master.8 The master,
through his servant, then owes such trespasser the duty of refraining
from wantonly or willfully injuring him;9 and, if he is discovered
in a perilous position, to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him.1 0
While the facts in the principal case do not show a wanton or willful
injury sufficient to bring it within the rule of the Higbee case, they
are some evidence of a failure to use ordinary care to avoid injuring
the plaintiff while in a perilous position, and under an application of
the tort rule might warrant holding the master liable. The principal
case, however, does not go on the theory of the cases which treat
the plaintiff as a trespasser."1 Following its previous decisions 12
and the dissenting opinion in the Higbee case, it refuses to hold the
master liable if the servant exceeded his authority in permitting the
plaintiff to be about the wagon. For this reason the trial court's
the wagon, and this was held sufficient to show a waiver of the rule. The
servant was not outside his scope of employment, the child was no trespasser,
and the case is in accord with the principal case as well as Dover v. Mfg. Co.,
supra, note 6.
39 C. J. 1304, par. 1502. A truck driver has no authority, real or apparent,
to hire help or carry passengers, the test of apparent authorify being ap-
pearances to a "reasonably prudent man." It might be urged, however, that
to a child the driver does appear to have authority, that the adult test should
not be applied to him, and that therefore he occupies somewhat the position of
a licensee, while an adult who knew better would not. See infra, note 11, also
Morris v. Peyton, 139 S. E. 500, 503 (Va. 1927). The language there treating
the child as a guest of the employer because he was invited by the driver goes
too far, however, with the argument here advanced. See recent case on liability
of master for negligence of servant toward licensee in a perilous position,
Malone v. Monongahela Traction Co., 141 S. E. 440 (W. Va. 1928).
'Higbee Co. v. Jackson, supra, note 2; Bobos v. Packing Co., 296 S. W.
157 (Mo. App., 1927).
10Stipetich v. Security Stove and Mfg. Co., 218 S. W. 964 (Mo. App.,
1920); Saleminme v. Mulloy:, 99 Conn. 474, 121 Atl. 870 (1923).
Nevertheless, the plaintiff in this case, whether characterized as a tres-
passer or not, is not culpable as a willful trespasser. There are in fact two
classes, and the law might fairly impose liability in favor of this plaintiff
while denying it to one who "hitched on" without invitation by anyone con-
nected with defendant's business.
'Supra, notes 6, 7; Butner v. Lumber Co., 180 N. C. 612, 105 S. E. 319
(1920).
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instruction to the jury was prejudicial to defendant, in that "it per-
mitted the jury to determine whether or not the driver was acting
within the scope of his employment without giving the defendant the
benefit of the rule which it had adopted to govern the conduct of
its drivers with reference to employing the plaintiff or permitting
him to be on or about the wagon." 13 The case is in harmony with
former decisions, and probably represents the present weight of
authority.14
G. M. HooD.
MORTGAGES-DEEDS OF TRUST-EQUITY OF REDEMPTION-FRAUD
-PREsumPTIONs-The plaintiff, for the purpose of securing his
note, payable to the order of the defendant, conveyed a certain lot
of land by deed of trust to a trustee. The note, becoming due and
unpaid, the plaintiff, thereafter, conveyed the said lot of land to the
defendant in fee simple. In an action to set aside said deed to the
defendant on the ground that it was a conveyance of plaintiff's
equity of redemption to his creditor, Held, that the conveyance of
the equity of redemption of the mortgagor under a deed of trust to
the holder of the note, is not presumed to be fraudulent or the result
of undue influence, and in the absence of allegations of fraud or
undue influence in the complaint, the plaintiff had not stated facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Simpson v. Fry, 194 N. C.
623, 140 S. E. 295 (1927).
It is a well-settled rule in North Carolina that where the mort-
gagee buys the equity of redemption of his mortgagor, the law pre-
sumes fraud, and the burden of proof is upon the mortgagee to
show the bona fides of the transaction.1 This rule is based on the
principle that the mortgagee stands in a trust relation to the mort-
gagor, from the existence of which the law raises a presumption of
fraud in any dealings between the parties, but the mortgagee so pur-
" There was some evidence of a custom for boys to assist defendant's
drivers. The trial court should have given the jury a test for determining
whether or not the rule of defendant was in force.
"Bowler v. O'Connell, 162 Mass. 319, 38 N. E. 498 (1894); Zainpella v.
Fitzhenry, 97 N. J. L. 517, 117 Atl. 711, 24 A. L. R. 666 (1922) ; Foster-Herbert
Cut Stone Co. v. Pugh, 115 Tenn. 688, 91 S. W. 199 (1906), accord. Smith
Bros., Inc. v. Williams, 294 S. W. 309 (Texarkana Civ. App. 1927), contra.1Alford v. Moore, 161 N. C. 382, 77 S. E. 343 (1913) ; Pritchard v. Smith,
160 N. C. 79, 75 S. E. 803 (1912) ; Jones v. Pullen, 115 N. C. 465, 20 S. E. 624
(1894); McLeod v. Bullard, 84 N. C. 516 (1881); Whitehead v. Hellen, 76 N.
C. 99 (1877) ; Lea v. Pearce, 68 N. C. 76 (1873).
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chasing may rebut this presumption by showing that the transaction
was free from fraud or oppression, and that the price was fair and
reasonable. 2 This is the minority rule in this country, the great
majority of the courts holding that no trust relation exists be-
tween the parties before sale; and that the mortgagee may purchase
the equity of redemption, though the transaction will be closely
scrutinized, so as to prevent any oppression of the debtor. The
trust relation arises only when the mortgagee sells the property under
the power of sale, so as to prevent him from purchasing.3 The dif-
ference in the two rules seems to be the result of the two theories
of the mortgage estate.4 In the majority of the states, the title to
the land does not pass and the mortgagee has only a security lien on
the property ;5 consequently, no trust relation exists, the parties
merely standing in the relation of debtor and creditor. 6 The North
Carolina court still adheres, in theory at least, to the old common-
law doctrine, that the legal title passes to the mortgagee.7 As a
result, the mortgagor is placed in the power of the mortgagee and
the latter can use the influence of his position for oppression or to
gain an unconscionable advantage over the mortgagor.8 This doctrine,
however, has been modified to a great extent in this state by equita-
ble principles, and in reality, the mortgagee under a mortgage deed
does not occupy a more advantageous position over the mortgagor
than the mortgagee who has only a lien or the holder of the notes
under a deed of trust; he holds the legal title merely as security with
none of the incidents of ownership, and it is now probably an open
question whether he is entitled to possession before default.9 The
power of each over the mortgagor is due, for the most part, to the
debt, and does not depend upon the legal title. Since the reason for
the rule has materially disappeared, and also because of its harshness
on the mortgagee, in that it restricts his right to protect his interests,
the rule is now subject to criticism.
'Jones v. Pullen, supra, note 1; McLeod v. Bullard, supra, note 1.
:2 Jones, Mortgages (1915), sec. 711.
'1 Jones, Mortgages (1915), se. 15.
5Ibid., sec. 17.
'De Martin v. Phelan, 47 Fed. 761; Phelan v. De Martin, 85 Cal. 365, 24
Pac. 725 (1891).
, Well v. Davis, 168 N. C. 298; 84 S. E. 395 (1915) ; Gorrell v. Alspaugh,
120 N. C. 362, 27 S. E. 85 ,(1897) ; Kiser v. Combs, 114 N. C. 640, 19 S. E. 664
(1894).
McLeod v. Bullard, 86 N. C. 210, 216 (1882).
"Stephens v. Turlington, 186 N. C. 191, 119 S. E. 210 (1923). The court
said, "Where there is no agreement to the contrary, certainly after default, the
mortgagee is entitled to enter ... " (writer's italics).
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Our court has also held that if the mortgagee assigns the note
and mortgage, he holds the title in trust for the assignee ;1o and too,
that the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and if he buys
the mortgagor's equity of redemption, he is subject to the same pre-
sumption of fraud which applies to a similar sale to the mortgagee.1 1
Since the assignor holds the legal title as security for the assignee,
it seems that the relation of the assignor and assignee is similar to
that of the trustee and the holder of the note under a deed of trust,
and consequently, the assignee should occupy the same relation to
the mortgagor as the holder of the note under a deed of trust. Since
the decision of the instant case, which seems to be clearly right, is
inconsistent with this former holding, it might be inferred that the
court has taken a step away from the rule. In all events, the decision
adds another incentive to the use of deeds of trust in this state.
R. T. GILES.
PERSONAL PROPERTY-ESTATE BY ENTIRETY-FUTURE INTERESTS
-The testatrix bequeathed "unto L. H. Culter and his wife Laura
D. Cutler . . $10,000 of my North Carolina 4% bonds of par
value, to have and to hold same . . bonds to them as husband
and wife by entireties and to the survivor of them in fee simple." It
was held by the majority of the Supreme Court that the husband
and wife did not take the bonds by entireties, but took them as ten-
ants in common, with no survivorship.1 The decision rests upon the
holding in Turlington v. Lucas,2 which ruled that an estate by en-
tirety in personal property is not recognized in North Carolina. A
dissenting opinion is written, to which there is a concurrence, the
basis of the dissent being that in spite of the fact, and granting, that
an estate by entirety is not recognized in North Carolina, yet "her
(the testatrix's) intention with respect to the estate or interest in
the bonds which they (Cutler and wife) should take under the will
is manifest. Such intention ought not, in my opinion, to be de-
feated by a construction of her language used in her will, which
results in holding as a matter of law that Mr. and Mrs. Cutler take
the bonds as tenants in common, and deprives them of their joint
estate or interest in the bonds during their lives, and further deprives
10 Collins v. Davis, 132 N. C. 106, 43 S. E. 579 (1903).
'Hall v. Lewis, 118 N. C. 509, 24 S. E. 209 (1896).
'Winchester v. Cutler, 194 N. C. 698, 140 S. E. 622 (1927).
2186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1924).
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the survivor of his or her absolute estate in the bonds. The estate or
interest which Mr. and Mrs. Cutler take in the bonds, is determined
not by law, but by the language of the testatrix, which shows her
intention as to such estate or interest."
It is difficult to see how the holding in Turlington v. Lucas
(supra) can be disregarded, as suggested in the dissenting opinion.
It is true that a will must be construed so as to effectuate the evident
intent of the testator ;3 yet, this ruld cannot be applied to the extent
of contravening some established rule of law or public policy ;4 or
more precisely, this rule of construction cannot be applied to the
extent of creating a tenancy by entirety in the bonds, in the husband
and wife, which, among other things, means immunity of their indi-
vidual shares from execution by creditors, when this was the par-
ticular evil that the court sought to, and did, eliminate by ruling
that an estate by entirety in personal property is not recognized in
North Carolina. It follows, then, that in spite of the testatrix's
intention that the legatees under her will should take by entireties,
they cannot do so.
The question then arises as to just what interest the legatees
should take. Although it is not possible to construe the will so as to
conform to the manifest intention of the testatrix, such construction
should conform as nearly as possible to that intention. What the
court has actually done in the instant case is to strike out the entire
phrase "by entireties and to the survivor of them in fee simple,"
thereby leaving nothing but a tenancy in common in the bonds. It
is hardly open to question but that the words "by entireties" were
properly eliminated. It is, however, debatable whether the words
"and to the survivor of them in fee simple" should fall with them.
At this point two questions may be raised: (1) Was the court war-
ranted in construing the latter phrase as a mere recital of an estate
by entirety-a reiteration--or does that phrase express an inde-
pendent, intelligible intent? 5 (2) If the phrase does raise an inde-
pendent, intelligible intent, can that intent be given effect?
'Lynch v. Melton, 151 N. C. 595, 64 S. E. 497 (1908).
4 Hertz v. Abrahan, 110 Ga. 707, 36 S. E. 409 (1900).
'Bowden v. Lynch, 173 N. C. 203, 91, S. E. 957 (1917): "It is presumed
that every part of a will 'expressed an intelligible intent, i.e., means something.'
(Wooten. v. Hobbs, 170 N. C. 214, 86 S. E. 811 (1915) and this intent is not
only to be 'gathered from the language used, if possible' (Freeman v. Freeman,
141 N. C. 99, 53 S. E. 620 (1906) 'but in seeking for his intention, we must not
pass by the language he has used. If so we shall make the will, and not ex-
pound it' (Alexander v. Alexander, 41 N. C. 231 (1847), and approved in
McCallum v. McCallum, 167 N. C. 311, 83 S. E. 250 (1914)."
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The principal incidents of an estate by entirety in land (which
are analagous to those in such an estate in personal property) are:
(1) husband and wife are seised per tout et non per my; (2) the
husband is entitled at common law to full control and usufructs of
land; and (3) the survivor gets the estate.6 Originally, the most
important of these incidents was that the survivor of the marriage
was entitled to the estate.7 As a practical matter this does not hold
entirely true today. The seisin per tout et non per my, which pre-
vents creditors of either the husband or wife from reaching the
property is probably the dominant incident today; at any rate, it
accounts for the creation of as many estates by entirety as any of
the other incidents. Indeed, the court in Turlington v. Lucas
(supra) gave as the particular reasons for not recognizing estates
by entirety in personalty not the incident of survivorship, but rather
the immunity of the individual shares of the husband and wife from
execution, and the control of the husband over the property. It is
these two latter incidents that are held to be contrary to public
policy.8
It, therefore, does not seem that the phrase "and to the survivor
of them in fee simple" is necessarily mere surplusage or a recital of
the principal incident of a tenacy by entirety. At any rate, the court
should not defeat such an expressed direction as to the disposition
of the testatrix's property by a legal construction of her language,
unless such a disposition of personal property is contrary to our law.
Even in those states where survivorship as to joint tenacy has been
abolished,9 it was not survivorship as a form of disposition of prop-
erty that the legislature and courts desired to eliminate, but rather
survivorship as an automatic incident to an estate, as reaching an
unexpected result. This objection does not obtain where survivor-
ship is specifically provided for in the instrument.' 0
There is no objection in this state to the creation of future inter-
ests in personalty by will.11 The testatrix could have bequeathed
the bonds to a trustee to hold for Cutler and wife during their joint
'Burdick, Real Property (1914), sec. 103.
'Tiffany, Real Property (2 ed. 1920), sec. 194.'See 2 N. C. L. Rev. 195.
'C. S. 1735." Taylor v. Sinith, 116 N. C. 531, 21 S. E. 202 (1894).
.Tones v. Zollicoffer, 4 N. C. 645 (1817); Carter v. Spencer 29 N. C. 14
(1846) ; Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (2 ed. 1906), App. F., sec. 849; Kale,
Estates Future Interests (2 ed. 1920) sec. 108.
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lives, paying the principal fund over to the survivor.1 2 The testa-
trix could have bequeathed the bonds to Cutler for life, and then to
the wife absolutely. 13 Could she not have bequeathed to Cutler and
wife for their lives, and then to X, a stranger, absolutely? It is
submitted that she could have. Could she not have bequeathed to
Cutler and wife for their lives, and then to X absolutely provided X
were living at the death of the surviving life tenant? It is sub-
mitted that the contingency would make no difference. Then, why
not a bequest to Cutler and wife for their joint lives, as tenants in
common, and then to the survivor of them, absolutely?
In any event, it is submitted that the question, whether or not
the refusal to recognize tenancy by entirety in personal property pre-
cludes the possibility of a limitation to husband and wife as tenants
in common during their joint lives, with a future interest limited to
the survivor, is not set at rest by this decision.
ALVIN S. KARTUS.
PLEAING-ACTIONS--JUDGMENT-BAR TO OTHER ACTIONS-
SINGLE ACT INJURING BOTH PERSON AND PROPERTY-The plaintiff
sustained injury to her person and also damage to her automobile
from a single negligent act. She recovered in an action for dam-
ages to the property and subsequently brought suit for personal
injuries. Held, that the wrongful act injuring both person and prop-
erty constituted two causes of action and that a recovery upon one
would not act as a bar to the other.' Had the plaintiff so wished
she could have exercised her privilege of joinder. 2
Where a single negligent act causes injury to both person and
property the courts in this country are in conflict as to whether this
gives rise to one cause of action or more.8 The instant case repre-
sents the minority view which is the English rule.4 This view bases
the cause of action on the injury.5 Damages to property and injury
"1Kale, Estates Future Interests, sec. 112.
"See cases cited in note 11, supra. As to whether such a future interest in
personalty is. in the nature of a remainder or executory limitation, see Gray,
Rule Against Perpetuities (2 ed. 1906), App. F. sec. 837.
'Endley v. Georgia Ry. & Power Co., 140 S. E. 386 (Ga. 1927).
'Georgia Civil Code 1910, see. 5521. In North Carolina all causes of
action arising out of the same transaction may be joined, C. S. 507.
21 C. J. 1058, 50 L. R. A. 161 note.
'Brundsen v. Humphrey, L. R. 14 Q. B. D. 141; MacDougald v. Knight, L.
R. 25 Q. B. Div. 8." Watson v. Texas & P. R. Co., 8 Tex. Civ. App. 144, 27 S. W. 924 (1894).
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to the person are infringements of different primary rights and if
one act violates both rights then two causes of action result.0 The
courts upholding this rule further contend that this is the correct
view since different rules of law are applicable to injuries respecting
personal and property rights, "especially on the question of limita-
tions, abatement and survival, and the assignability of claims."
7
The majority rule bases the cause of action on the wrongful or
negligent act producing the injury and if both property and person
are injured by a single act then one cause of action accrues with
distinct elements of damages.8
It has been said: "A right of action at law arises from the exist-
ence of a primary right in the plaintiff and an invasion of that right
by some delict on the part of the defendant. The facts which estab-
lish the existence of that right and that delict constitute the cause
of action." Then is it accurate to contend that the injury to the
exclusion of the act, or the act to the exclusion of the injury con-
stitutes the cause of action? Are not both equally vital and indis-
pensable to the creation of a cause of action? It is true that
negligence is not actionable until damage results, but conversely no
damage would result but for the negligent act.
The reasons given for the English rule "are not those of trial
convenience, but of technical objections concerning the resulting
rights,"'10 being based upon historical incidents with their origin in
the ancient writs. These procedural difficulties "present no insuper-
able reason why all rights such as they are can not be adjusted at
one time."'1  For example, if the limitation is different as to the
right of recovery for violation of the rights, and the statute runs on
one, then this element of damage is simply extinguished.
'Supra, note 4; Reilly v. Sicillian Asphalt Pay. Co., 170 N. Y. 40, 62 N. E.
772 (1902) ; Boyd v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. (D. C.) 218 Fed. 653 (1914).
"Supra, note 1; Reilly v. Sicillian Asphalt Pay. Co., supra, note 6; Ochs v.
Public Service Ry. Co., 81 N. J. Law 661, 80 A. 495 (1911).
1 King v. Chicago M. and St. P. Ry. Co., 80 Minn. 83, 82 N. W. 1113 (1900);
Birmingham So. Ry. Co. v. Litner, 141 Ala. 420, 38 So. 363 (1904) ; Cassidy v.
Berkovitz, 169 Ky. 789, 185 S. W. 129 (1916); Smith v. Cincinnati N. 0. and
T. P. Ry. Co., 136 Tenn. 282, 189 S. W. 367 (1916) ; Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg.
Co., 131 N. C. 536, 42 S. E. 983 (1902). In the case of Eller v. Railroad, 140
N. C. 140. 52 S. E. 305 (1905) it was held that a recovery for the delayed de-
livery and damage to plaintiff's trousseau precluded an action for mental
anguish caused by the delay wherein her wedding had to be postponed.
Pavelka v. St. Albert Soc., 82 Conn. 146, 72 A. 725 (1909); Pomeroy's
Code Remedies (4 ed.), 460, sec. 347, cited in 60 U. Pa. L. R. 543 (1912).
"C. E. Clark, 25 Mich. L. R. 428 (1927).
Supra, note 10.
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The majority rule allowing only one suit to be brought where
both person and property are injured, brings about more practical
justice. Unnecessary vexation of the defendant is prevented and
the plaintiff could not reasonably complain, because "when a litigant
has had his day in court, he ought not to be encouraged by subtle
distinctions to a renewal of the contest in a different form, par-
ticularly if he knew or could have known the extent of his injury."'
2
By preventing a multiplicity of suits, which is not essential to con-
serve the ends of justice, public expense will be lessened. Further-
more, the witnesses will not be unduly harassed and imposed upon
by being asked to duplicate their evidence, since all the issues can
be settled without prejudice in one suit.
CHARLES W. McANALLY.
PUBLIC UTILITIES--CARRIERS--DETRIMENTAL COMPETITION-
According to the recent case of Monongahela West Penn P. S. Co. v.
State Road Commissionl the public policy of the state of West Vir-
ginia requires that public utilities be given reasonable protection
from detrimental competition; and the decision in the case is, that
when an existing carrier is one of several applicants for the initial
permit to operate motor busses between points on its line, and it is
fully qualified to render the additional service proposed, the carrier
should ordinarily be given preference.
Under our present system of state control does not the state, as
an incident to its regulatory powers, owe a duty to protect its public
utilities? Formerly "competition is the life of trade" was accepted
as a guiding maxim of economics. That maxim has since been re-
jected so far as it applies to public utilities. This change came about
as a natural consequence of state control. The method of regulation
now in force is based on the theory of a regulated monopoly rather
than competition, and before one utility is permitted to take the
business of another already in the field it is but a matter of fairness
and justice that it be shown that the new utility is in a position to
render better service to the public. If not, the existing transporta-
tion agency should be given preference.2 In all cases, of course, pub-
'W. H. Loyd, 60 U. Pa. L. R. 545 (1912).
1139 S. E. 744 (W. Va., 1927).
'Re Maine Motor Coaches Inc., (Me.) P. U. R. 1926 B, 545, citing de-
cisions from the commissions of 27 states as "in harmony" with the conclusion
reached in that case; Washington Ry. & E. Co. v. Washington Rapid Transit
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lic convenience and necessity should be made paramount to the
interest of the utility; and existing transportation systems should be
protected only so far as compatible with the public interest.3
A different question arises where the case does not involve a
choice of applicants for the same service. The service offered by a
new means of transportation frequently is so different from that
being rendered that it can be considered only incidentally competi-
tive with it.4 In such case it is only necessary to decide whether the
existing service is adequate or not.6 Where the court is compelled
to decide between applicants for the same service, undoubtedly pref-
erence will be given to an existing carrier, whose experience in oper-
ation, responsibility, financial resources, and permanency have been
established. Thus the public interests will be better served and that
is the ultimate aim of governmental control.
JOHN C. RODMAN, JR.
Co. (Dist. of Col.), P. U. R. 1922 C, 754; Egyptian Transp. System vi. Louis-
ville & N. R. Co., 321 Ill. 588, 152 N. E. 510, 513 (1926) : "It is in accord with
justice and sound business economy that the utility already in the field be given
an opportunity to furnish the required service"; Re Blue and Gray Bus Lile
(Utah), P. U. R. 1924 A, 449, which goes so far as to yield to railroads a "natu-
ral preferential right to extend service instead of permitting competition by an
autobus company."
'For a discussion of this phase of the problem, see Re Maine Motor
Coaches Inc., supra, where it was said that the question whether a motor carrier
should be permitted to compete with existing carriers ought to be determined
upon the basis of whether the rights, welfare, and interest of the general
public will be advanced by the prosecution of the enterprise.4 Norfolk Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 179, 126 S. E. 82
(1925) ; McLain v. Utilities Commission, 110 Ohio St. 11 143 N. E. 381 (1924),
in which the court expresses itself against "the establishment of a policy of
protecting railroad transportation as against motor transportation interests";
Rapid Ry. v. Utilities Commission, 225 Mich. 425, 196 N. W. 518 (1923),
where it was held that the commission cannot consider other transportation
facilities, such as railroads, in passing on questions of convenience and necessity,
but must limit inquiry to the motor vehicle business.
' State statutes require that permit may not be issued except on showing
that the privilege is necessary for public convenience and that the service is not
being adequately performed. To the same effect under the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, see U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1925), §8563 (18-20).
